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Abstract: Policymakers are seeking a transformation of the energy system driven by 
concerns about climate change, energy security and affordability. At the same time, 
emerging developments in underpinning science and engineering are opening up new 
possibilities across the whole technology spectrum covering renewables and other supply 
side technologies, energy demand and energy infrastructure. This paper reviews both the 
“policy pull” for energy innovation activities and the “science and technology push”.  
It explores the expectations of a variety of organisations in both the public and private 
sector regarding these pressures and possibilities by assessing various scenarios and 
outlook exercises that have been published since 2013. It reveals a wide range of beliefs 
about the future development of the energy system. The paper then moves on to analyse 
private sector expenditure on energy research and development (R&D) and public sector 
budgets for energy R&D and demonstration (RD&D). This analysis demonstrates 
significant divergences in patterns of innovation between the private and public sectors and 
leads to the hypothesis that the private sector is, broadly, taking measures to reinforce the 
existing energy paradigm while the public sector is focusing on new energy technologies 
that support wider policy objectives. This pattern is consistent with past technological 
transitions, with innovation efforts that would transform the energy system being 
counteracted by countervailing efforts that reinforce the existing fossil fuel-based paradigm. 
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1. Introduction 
The global energy system provides, through a complex web of processes and interactions, the 
foundation for almost all modern human activities. Transportation, heating, light and the electronic 
systems which drive modern economies all depend on global energy supplies. These supplies are largely 
fossil-fuel based, with natural gas, liquid fuels and coal providing the input fuels for the vast majority 
of the world’s energy demands. 
The energy sector is substantial, having made up almost 4% of total economic activity for reporting 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries in 2009 [1]. The energy 
system has historically been characterised as “mature”, displaying small, incremental technological 
improvements and low levels of both public and private research intensity. Consumers have traditionally 
played a passive role in energy markets, which tend to be dominated by large vertically-integrated 
firms competing on cost to provide largely undifferentiated products. Firms operating in such markets 
tend not to be research and development (R&D) intensive. The European Union (EU) Industrial R&D 
scoreboard [2] shows the average research intensity (R&D expenditure divided by total sales) of oil 
and gas producers and electricity producers to be 0.3% and 0.5% respectively. This compares with an 
industrial average of 3.2% and R&D intensities as high as 14% in sectors such as pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology and 10% in software and computer services. 
Over the past decade, the situation has been changing. Innovative activity in the energy sector has 
expanded in many countries as indicated both by new energy technologies coming to market and by 
increases in public R&D expenditure [3]. Public R&D has focused largely on renewable technologies, 
infrastructure and energy efficiency. As support grows for energy innovation so too does the need to 
understand the interactions between the commercial forces and public policy interventions currently 
driving energy innovation. This will help to manage efficiently and deploy the vast public and private 
expenditure currently occurring in this sector. 
This paper examines the major factors associated with the revitalization of energy innovation, the 
changing distribution of energy R&D resources and the underlying scientific developments which are 
providing transformative energy opportunities. It analyses how different organisations in both the 
public and private sectors anticipate that these drivers will affect global energy markets in the coming 
decades. It then identifies trends in public and private sector research, development and demonstration 
(RD&D) based on data from the International Energy Agency (IEA) for the public sector and the 
European Union (EU) for the private sector. The different patterns of R&D effort suggest a tension 
between innovation aimed at transforming the energy system and innovations which could extend the 
resource base and improve the efficiency of the current fossil fuel-based paradigm. 
Innovation systems theory provides the framework for the paper. Within this framework, innovation 
is seen as an evolutionary, non-linear process. Government policy can influence innovation through 
technology push and demand pull mechanisms [4]. In this paper, the notion of technology push is 
expanded to cover science and technology as we argue that fundamental scientific advances are 
opening up new opportunities in the energy sector. Science and technology push mechanisms affect the 
generation and development of new knowledge, whether this is scientific advancement or non-technical 
innovations such as new business models. These mechanisms include publicly-funded research, 
knowledge exchange programmes, education and training support and incentives for private sector 
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organisations to invest in R&D. Demand pull can be influenced by policy mechanisms that shape the 
demand for new innovative products. These mechanisms are often divided into three categories:  
direct purchases, mainly government procurement schemes; regulatory and standardisation measures; 
and economic incentives, including tax breaks, subsidies and other measures. 
To examine trends in both public and private expenditure on energy RD&D, we utilise datasets 
compiled by international organisations such as the OECD, IEA and World Bank. The limitations of 
these datasets should be kept in mind. They rely on the quality of submissions from member countries 
which, for example, may be missing for particular countries/years, and may not always use precisely 
the same definitions. However, these still represent the best data available and, if approached critically, 
can be used to identify major trends and formulate working hypotheses. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of policy developments currently 
influencing the energy sector, focusing mainly on climate change and energy security. Section 3 
identifies several areas of basic science development which could provide transformative opportunities 
by enhancing or developing new technologies for use in the energy sector. Section 4 examines the way 
that different organisations anticipate that economic and social trends, policy-influenced demand pull 
and science and technology push could play out in the energy sector at the global level. This is done by 
analysing published scenarios and outlooks exploring the time horizon to 2040. Section 5 examines 
past and current trends in both public and private expenditure on energy RD&D. Section 6 assesses 
these patterns of expenditure within the frame of innovation theory. Section 7 provides some overall 
conclusions and points the way towards future research into energy innovation. 
2. The Policy Pull 
Ready access to cheap, abundant energy supplies is essential for the smooth operation and 
competitiveness of any modern economy. For this reason, and because strong elements of natural 
monopoly still exist, policymakers play a significant role in maintaining, altering and regulating energy 
markets. The energy policy challenge can be seen in terms of striking a balance between three broad 
objectives: energy security; affordability; and managing environmental impacts. These three policy 
drivers form what is commonly referred to as a “trilemma” (Figure 1), a triangle of forces both 
reinforcing and in tension with each other [5]. At times, the primary task of policymakers has been to 
balance the cost of energy to consumers with concerns regarding secure access to energy supplies. 
Currently, the significant contribution that conventional energy sources make to carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions and therefore climate change has become a major concern. In developing countries, there are 
also major concerns about air, water and land pollution. The trilemma is used as a means of both 
representing the direction of travel and relative weighting of each policy force at a given point in  
time [6]. 
Members of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) set the goal of holding 
global temperature increases to less than 2 °C above pre-industrial levels in Cancun in 2010 [7]. Figure 2 
illustrates the relationship between cumulative carbon dioxide emissions and global temperature. The 
intention is to conclude a comprehensive global climate change agreement at the UNFCCC Conference 
of the Parties in Paris in 2015. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded in 
its Fifth Assessment Report that global emissions would need to be 40% to 70% lower in 2050 than in 
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2010 in order to make it likely that global temperature increases would remain lower than 2 °C above 
pre-industrial levels [8]. 
Figure 1. The energy trilemma. 
 
Figure 2. Cumulative and projected CO2 emissions from 1870 to 2100 [8]. 
 
To hit this target will require a wholesale transformation of the global energy system and a radical 
change from current energy trends which, due to heavy usage of fossil fuels, are heavily linked to CO2 
emissions. The IEA has concluded that the current energy technologies available to the market at scale 
are not capable of reducing CO2 levels to the level required to hit the 2 degree target [9]. It has argued 
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for a “technological transformation” of the energy system, including significantly increased RD&D 
budgets over a sustained period of time, in order to support the technological advances needed to meet 
the 2 °C target. The IEA estimates the investment costs between now and 2050 of meeting the 2 °C 
target as being over $36 trillion more than would be the case in a scenario with no further carbon 
reduction policies. This would include a more than doubling of RD&D expenditure, [10] with the 
decarbonisation of the electricity sector absorbing a great deal of this resource. 
Energy security issues have also been of renewed concern to policymakers over the last decade. 
Supplies of primary energy resources are unevenly distributed at the global level and many developed 
and emerging economies are not energy self-sufficient. The increasing energy needs of large developing 
Asian countries such as China and India are increasing competition for supplies on world markets at 
the same time as developed nations are sourcing more of their primary energy resources internationally 
in response to dwindling domestic stocks, as shown in Figure 3. Another aspect of energy security is the 
need to access modern and reliable energy sources in low income countries. Decentralised renewable 
generation has advantages in such countries which often have poorly developed grid networks [11]. 
Figure 3. Net crude oil imports 1971–2011 [12]. 
 
After a significant fall in exports from the Middle East following the 1970s oil crises, oil exports to 
developed countries have recovered to pre-crisis levels, even as the region experiences significant 
political instability [12]. Other global events such as the Fukushima disaster and the Ukraine crisis 
have raised prices and added volatility to global markets. Prices of crude oil averaged $108/barrel in 
2013 (Brent), compared to average prices in the 1990s of under $20/barrel, as shown in Figure 4 [13]. 
The notion of energy independence, and the prospect of insulation from volatile global markets,  
is an enticing one for many policymakers. The recent boom in shale gas has raised the prospect of 
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energy independence for the US. This has the potential to change the dynamics of the global energy 
system dramatically. 
Figure 4. Annual average crude oil prices 1971–2012 [14]. 
 
There are a number of synergies between two of the drivers in the energy trilemma, climate change 
and energy security. Many of the technologies available to decarbonise the electricity system for 
example, such as wind and solar power also promote energy self-sufficiency. However, measures to 
address these two drivers are often costlier than a business-as-usual approach and can therefore have a 
negative impact on affordability. Since the global financial crisis in 2008, measures to address climate 
change have faced greater political opposition, as exemplified by the repeal of the Australian carbon 
tax [15]. However, energy efficiency measures, some of the most cost-effective and immediate actions 
to reduce CO2 emissions, reduce primary energy demand thus improving energy security and enhance 
affordability by reducing energy costs. 
The combined effect of the three policy drivers creates a strong “pull” effect on the energy 
innovation process, as policymakers seek to promote the development and deployment of new energy 
technologies that will help resolve the energy trilemma. However, it is also important to consider the 
“push” effect from developments in basic underpinning science that provide new opportunities for the 
development of potentially transformative technologies. 
3. The Science and Technology Push 
Innovation in the energy sector has tended to be incremental in recent decades, with small 
improvements in efficiency and reductions in the cost of existing system components. The current energy 
system relies on large assets with long payback times and is dominated by a small number of large 
industrial players. These factors encourage “lock-in” to existing technological paradigms [16]. This 
section shows that developments in basic science relevant to the energy sector can provide a “push” that 
has the potential for a more radical transformation of technology, new energy system innovations. 
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In November 2005, the IEA’s Ad-hoc Group on Science and Energy Technologies (AHGSET) held 
a workshop to investigate the critical connections between basic scientific programmes and applied 
energy programs [17]. This workshop identified several key technology challenges for the energy sector, 
chiefly improving the performance of energy storage, intelligent management of electricity networks to 
integrate distributed generation and intermittency, improving the performance of solar PV (photovoltaics) 
and bioenergy technologies and improving energy efficiency across buildings, transport and industry [18]. 
The IEA also identifies three key barriers preventing greater links between basic science and energy 
technology development: different goals, incentives and time horizons between basic and applied R&D; 
organisational and communication issues between teams; and intellectual property rights (IPR) 
concerns [19]. Emerging developments in several fields of basic science are showing great promise for 
the energy sector, and three of these are highlighted below: computational technologies; materials 
science; and the biosciences. 
Information and communication technologies (ICT) have made major and transformative 
breakthroughs in many sectors over the past 20 years. The finance, retail, entertainment, news media, 
and health sectors are examples of areas that have undergone substantial change as a result of ICT 
applications. Indeed, the pace and magnitude of change have led many to refer to an “information 
revolution” [20]. This revolution has had limited direct effects on the energy sector to this point,  
with ICT generally being used in system modelling and monitoring applications. The concept of the 
“smart grid”, however, proposes to extend ICT capabilities throughout the electricity network, bringing 
a wealth of informational and control applications as well as allowing consumers direct access to the 
electricity market through smart metering and demand-side participation technologies [21]. 
Integrating these technologies into the existing network can therefore assist the resolution of issues 
such as the integration of large quantities of intermittent generation into the electricity system, as well 
as allowing smaller domestic consumers to become full and active participants into the electricity 
system. This can permit the full integration of distributed generation and energy storage into advanced 
concepts such as microgrids, which are localised grids connecting distributed generation, demand and 
storage units and have the ability to operate autonomously if required. It also enables virtual power 
plants (VPPs), aggregations of hundreds of units of distributed generation which can operate in the 
market as if they were a single dispatchable power plant [22]. 
The large increases in computational power seen over the last decade have also led to other 
technological solutions for the energy sector. Complex models of the energy system, on the regional, 
national and global scales, can be constructed to aid policymakers and system planners [23]. 
Supercomputers have the capabilities to model and design materials on the atomic and molecular 
scales, benefitting the development of new materials and electrochemical technologies. 
The material sciences, assisted in part by the computational advances described above, are providing a 
series of transformative opportunities across the energy sector. It is now possible to “design” materials 
on an almost atom-by-atom basis. This has found application in the micro-electronics and flat-screen 
display technology sectors driven by requirements for increased efficiency and longevity. Potential 
applications in the energy sector include advances in the efficiency and cost-competitiveness of 
photovoltaic (PV) cells, fuel cells, large-scale batteries for energy storage and hydrogen storage and 
transportation applications. [24] Advances in large-scale materials manufacturing also have applications 
in the fabrication of power plants and electricity infrastructure. Pressure vessels for nuclear reactors and 
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blades for wind turbines can be manufactured at greater size and with fewer structural flaws due to 
these advances. 
Bioenergy could potentially benefit from a range of opportunities arising from advances in the 
biological sciences, including a greater understanding of microbiological processes underlying the 
photosynthetic process, plant growth and development and resistance to disease and extreme weather. 
Selective breeding and advances in genomics could allow the creation of bioenergy crops which are 
more precisely tailored to their environment and can utilise available non-arable land and limited water 
supplies in a more sustainable manner. For example, funding from the US Department of Energy has 
established the complete DNA sequence of the black cottonwood tree (a type of poplar), which could 
lead to better feedstocks for cellulosic ethanol [25]. The more efficient conversion of crops into 
biofuels, especially “second-generation” biofuels extracted from lignocellulosic (woody) parts of the 
plant or plant waste is also assisted by basic biological science advances [26]. The efficient processing 
of lignocellulosic material from “second generation” crops, which include willow and miscanthus, 
provides greater energy yields and lower emissions in comparison to first-generation biofuels 
manufactured from food crops, as well as avoiding the use of food crops for biofuel production. 
Some of these scientific advances go back decades, but it is only now that technology is emerging to 
allow commercial application. There is typically a significant time lag between a basic research 
breakthrough and commercialisation. A considerable amount of work is needed to scale up technology, 
demonstrate feasibility at scale, establish a supply chain and reduce costs to an acceptable level for mass 
commercialisation. The lead time varies from sector to sector. ICT projects move to commercialisation 
relatively quickly, whereas new energy generation technologies such as solar and wind can take 
considerably longer. [27] For example, the first solar PV cell was demonstrated by Bell Labs in 1954, 
but mass deployment as a large scale energy resource did not begin until the 1990s [28]. 
In conclusion, there is currently a considerable “push” effect on energy technology innovation from 
recent scientific developments and many synergies with the policy-induced “demand-pull”. 
4. Global Projections 
The trends in global policy and basic science advances highlighted above illustrate a global energy 
system in flux, with a complex series of drivers and global priorities interacting with each other in 
often unpredictable ways. There is a tension between a continuation of the incremental technological 
change seen over recent decades and the more fundamental transformations made possible by 
developments in basic science. At the same time, there are differences in view about both the feasibility 
and the desirability of radical energy system change, particularly in response to the climate change 
challenge. These tensions and differences are reflected in the views taken by different organisations 
regarding the development of the energy system (Table 1). These views in turn form the basis of the 
R&D strategies that different organisations in both the private and public sectors are following. In this 
section, we assess different views of the future before addressing R&D strategies in Section 5. 
These scenarios are underpinned by three main philosophical approaches. Normative scenarios take 
an assumptive endpoint, often the goal of holding global temperatures below 2 °C above pre-industrial 
temperatures, and “backcast” from this endpoint, modelling the policy and technology options for 
meeting this goal at the lowest cost. An example of this type is the two degrees (2DS) scenario found 
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in the IEA’s Energy Technology Perspectives publication, which provides a normative scenario based 
around the attainment of the 2 °C target in 2050 [9]. Over 900 scenarios of this type have been collected 
and assessed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as part of the Fifth Assessment 
Report [8]. 
Table 1. Key scenario/projection indicators for 2040. 
Scenario/Projection Style 
Final Demand for 
Electricity (EJ) 
Energy-Related CO2 
Emissions (billion·t) 
2011 baseline - 66 31 
IEA 2 degrees Normative 108 20 
IEA 4 degrees Adopts Cancún pledges 120 40 
IEA 6 degrees BAU projection 131 52 
EIA International Energy Outlook Outlook 127 45 
ExxonMobil Outlook for Energy Outlook 124 36 
Shell Mountains scenario Exploratory 131 37 
Shell Oceans scenario Exploratory 159 41 
Many organisations develop outlooks, a catch-all term for the process of projecting current trends in 
the energy system along a path defined by foreseeable policy, economic and technological changes. 
These are often known as “business-as-usual” scenarios. They are generally incompatible with the  
2 °C target. Outlooks are produced by public national and supranational organisations such as the US 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) [29], the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) [30] and the IEA with its 4DS and 6DS scenarios [9]. Large private-sector corporations such 
as ExxonMobil [31], and BP group [32] also produce outlooks to guide executives and investors.  
The time horizon for these outlooks commonly ranges from 2035 to 2040, with the IEA scenarios 
looking further out to 2050. 
Shell’s scenarios [33] are exploratory in character and the latest versions provide two alternative 
qualitative “storylines”, focusing on different visions of the next fifty years. These extend to 2060 and 
are designed to ensure that Shell’s strategies are robust against a plausible range of futures. 
A comparison of the six scenarios referenced above from the IEA, EIA, OPEC, ExxonMobil, Shell 
and BP for 2040 reveals a considerable range of energy futures and thus deep uncertainty over the path 
the energy system will take. This comparison is represented in Figure 5. An important high-level 
message from the comparison is that “new” energy technologies such as electric vehicles and 
renewables play a role in all the scenarios, although with slower rollouts and reduced market share in 
the “business-as-usual” outlooks. All scenarios project a significant rise in energy demand from the 
2011 baseline, though this is much less in the IEA 2DS scenario. 
Several energy technologies are common across all scenarios. A large expansion in the role of 
natural gas is commonly accepted, with most of the outlooks also entailing substantive increases in the 
roles of coal and oil. This leads to growth in energy related CO2 emissions across all scenarios except 
the IEA 2DS scenario, which is normative and meets the 2 °C target. The other scenarios are 
unconstrained by the 2 °C target (though the IEA 4DS scenario takes the pledges made at the Cancun 
agreement into account) and therefore project both significantly higher levels of energy demand and a 
greater proportion of that demand being met from fossil fuels. Renewable energy grows in all 
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scenarios, though it still makes up only a small proportion of total energy demand. The renewables 
share is greatest in the Shell Oceans scenario, which features a substantial growth in solar PV driven 
by large-scale cost reductions. 
Figure 5. Primary energy demand in different global energy scenarios/projections  
for 2040 [9,30–33]. 
 
There are also several key differences between the scenarios, with the IEA 2DS scenario differing 
most strongly from the others. The 2DS scenario projects a rapid expansion of all forms of renewable 
energy generation, nuclear power, carbon capture and storage (CCS) and energy efficiency measures. 
Oil and coal usage drops substantially from the 2011 baseline, and energy demand is substantially 
lower than the other scenarios. The role of bioenergy varies significantly with expansions seen in the 
IEA scenarios and Shell Mountains, but decreases seen in the ExxonMobil, BP and EIA scenarios.  
The growth of energy related CO2 emissions is lower in the ExxonMobil and Shell Mountains 
scenarios than the other outlooks. ExxonMobil foresees greater energy efficiency savings while the 
Shell Mountains scenario includes large-scale investments in CCS technology. 
The next two sections explore how the thinking embodied in these scenarios has led to significant 
divergences in patterns of investment in R&D across organisations, notably divergences between those 
in the public and private sectors. 
5. RD&D Patterns 
5.1. Public R&D Trends 
As discussed above, policymakers’ interest in energy innovation has sharply increased over the last 
decade, following a twenty-year slump after the end of the 1970s energy crises. The IEA collects annual 
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data on public sector energy innovation budgets from its member countries. Data is collected using a 
questionnaire sent by the IEA to relevant government departments, allowing trends in historical data to 
be compiled. Due to potential differences in the scope and categorisation of data, cross-country 
comparisons in the level of spend should be taken as indicative. 
Figure 6 shows the total investment in RD&D in 2012 USD adjusted for purchasing power parity 
(PPP) across IEA countries 1974–2011 [3], with the average annual price of oil superimposed on the 
graph [14]. Table 2 shows the value of public sector RD&D spend across IEA countries in 2011. 
Figure 6. Investment in energy RD&D in IEA countries and average price of crude oil 
1974–2011 [3,14]. 
 
Table 2. Public sector RD&D spend in IEA countries 2011 [3]. 
Area Spend 
Energy Efficiency 3.1 
Fossil Fuels 1.8 
Renewable Energy 3.7 
Nuclear 4.4 
Hydrogen and Fuel Cells 0.7 
Power and Storage 0.9 
Cross-cutting 2.6 
Total 17.2 
This shows a strong correlation between the price of oil and the quantity of global public RD&D 
activity, with the caveat that a direct causal relationship should not necessarily be inferred. However, 
the high and volatile oil prices witnessed over the last decade have undoubtedly had some influence on 
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policymakers. Of further interest is the shift between nuclear (both fission and fusion) and renewables 
RD&D activity which has occurred over the last few decades. While making up the bulk of energy 
RD&D activities in the late 1970 and early 80s, rising to a peak of $11 billion in 1981, the nuclear 
share of the total has decreased to roughly 30%, $4.4 billion, in 2011, driven by a shift away from 
nuclear fission in several European countries. A large share of public nuclear research resources are 
currently being spent on fusion development, much of it on the internationally-funded experimental 
ITER (the acronym ITER once stood for International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) reactor 
located in France. The shares of renewables, hydrogen and fuel cells, energy efficiency, cross-cutting 
research and basic science have increased sharply since the 2008 financial crisis, driven by stimulus 
packages in the US and increasing commercialisation and deployment of “new” and renewable  
energy sources. 
The figures for energy public RD&D in IEA member states are dominated by three regions: the US, 
Europe and Japan. The regional historical spend in public energy RD&D for these are detailed in 
Figure 7 (the European data covers the six largest funders of energy research: Germany, France, UK, 
Italy, Spain and The Netherlands. These were selected for the quality and continuity of their RD&D 
data. In 2011 these six countries covered 68% of EU/energy RD&D.). Figures 8–10 present historical 
spend in each of the three regions by IEA technology grouping. The US Department of Energy (DOE) 
funds a large quantity of basic science and scientific facilities as part of its remit, accounting for much 
of the “Other” spend seen in Figure 8 [19]. 
Each of the three regions has had a significantly different spend profile. Japan, being heavily reliant 
on nuclear power due to a lack of indigenous fossil fuel resources, has a budget that is dominated by 
the nuclear sector. Japan funds an extensive programme of public spending on reactor design, 
maintenance and fuel reprocessing, as well as a substantial fusion programme. Europe’s profile has 
changed over the years, dominated by nuclear in the 1980s but becoming more balanced between 
renewables, efficiency and nuclear in the 2000s. The US has maintained a relatively balanced portfolio 
in recent years, but with a very high spend in 2009 due to the post-financial crisis stimulus package. 
Following high budgetary points in the late 1970s/early 1980s (for the US $9.6 billion in 1979, for 
Europe $6.5 billion in 1981) as a response to the 1970s energy crises, budgets for energy RD&D 
decreased rapidly and substantially over the 1980s in both the US and Europe. By 1992 budgets had 
decreased to $3.2 billion in the US and $2 billion in Europe. These reductions in public spending need 
to be seen in the context of sustained low oil prices, as shown in Figure 6, as well as liberalisation and 
privatisation in the energy sector. Japan’s budget for energy RD&D, on the contrary, remained fairly 
constant throughout this period at an average of approximately $3.2 billion. 
As discussed in Section 2, the last decade has seen a step change in the policy measures deployed to 
mitigate climate change as well as steep rises in the price of oil driven by tightening supplies and 
increasing demand from developed nations. This has been associated with considerable increases and 
changes in the spend profile of public energy RD&D budgets. Table 3 shows the change in budget 
allocations for different research areas between 2000 and 2011. Global trends show a considerable 
increase across the board for budgets for renewable energy sources, fossil fuels, including carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) technology, and the hydrogen and fuel cell sector. There are also some 
interesting regional trends. 
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Figure 7. Historic Public Energy RD&D Spend in the US, Japan and major European 
economies 1974–2011. [3]. 
 
Figure 8. Historic Public Energy Spend by Sector for the US 1974–2011 [3]. 
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Figure 9. Historic Public Energy Spend by Sector for Japan 1974–2011 [3]. 
 
Figure 10. Historic Public Energy Spend by Sector for the major European economies 
1974–2011 [3]. 
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Table 3. RD&D Budgets and percentage changes for research areas 2000–2011 [3]. 
Research Area 
US Japan Major European Economies 
2000 2011 % Change 2000 2011 % Change 2000 2011 % Change 
1. Energy Efficiency 702 898 128 570 301 −47 137 908 664 
2. Fossil Fuels 270 514 190 106 323 304 84 286 339 
3. Renewable Energy Sources 275 1182 430 150 627 418 244 918 376 
4. Nuclear 356 1248 351 2563 1742 −32 1242 1039 -16 
5. Hydrogen and Fuel Cells 0 265 - 0 97 - 0 124 - 
6. Other Power and Storage Technologies 161 182 113 162 110 −32 178 258 145 
7. Other Cross-cutting research 1190 2200 185 74 2 −97 142 174 123 
Total 2955 6489 220 3624 3203 −12 2021 3708 183 
US budgets increased by the largest amount over the period, with a total increase of 220%. Note 
that the figures for 2011 do not cover the “spike” associated with the stimulus programme in 2009 
when energy RD&D budgets totalled $10.3 billion. Only the US increased nuclear budgets over this 
period, with an increase of 351% between 2001 and 2011. 
Japan has seen a small decrease of 12% in its total RD&D budget. The nuclear sector still remains 
the dominant segment of this budget with a total allocation of $1.7 billion in 2011. However this 
represents a 32% decrease in funding since 2000. This funding has been reallocated to diversify 
Japan’s portfolio into unconventional fossil fuels and CCS as well as renewable energy, with increases of 
304% and 418% respectively. In stark contrast with the other two regions, energy efficiency research has 
dropped by almost half in Japan. 
Total energy RD&D budgets for the major European economies during this period rose from  
$2 billion to $3.7 billion, with dramatic increases in renewable energy and energy efficiency. Budgets 
for renewable energy sources rose from $244 million in 2000 to $918 million in 2011, an increase of 
376%. Budgets for energy efficiency expanded by 664% from $137 million in 2000 to $907 million in 
2011. This rise for energy efficiency RD&D is by far the greatest seen across the three regions and. 
Europe is also investing heavily in CCS technology, fuelling a steep rise in fossil fuel research budgets. 
These policy shifts and RD&D budgets have been associated with exponential growth in the 
deployment of renewable generation, chiefly wind and solar PV, over the last decade (Figure 11). 
Between 2004 and 2012, global wind power capacity grew 660% from an installed capacity of 48 GW in 
2004 to 318 GW in 2012. Solar PV grew more strongly from a lower base, increasing 2600% from 
3.9GW in 2004 to 102 GW in 2012. Capacity continued growing strongly throughout the financial crisis. 
Overall, the picture of global public RD&D budgets is one of substantial and transformative change. 
Spending on renewable generation technologies and energy efficiency has increased rapidly and 
greatly, while spending on hydrogen, fuel cells and energy storage technologies has likewise increased. 
Public RD&D associated with CCS technology has driven steep rises in the fossil fuel sector, 
especially in Europe. Total public energy RD&D efforts have approximately doubled in the US and 
Europe even through a time of financial crisis. This suggests that policymakers see energy as a critical 
issue and RD&D as an important use of public funds. This all adds up into a picture of public innovation 
effort, an attempt to shift the established paradigm of the energy system towards diversified, low-carbon 
supply and high levels of efficiency. 
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Figure 11. Global cumulative installed capacity of wind and solar PV generation  
2004–2012 [34,35]. 
 
5.2. Private Sector Energy R&D Patterns 
The availability of data on private sector energy R&D is less than that for the public sector. This 
section relies on the EU Industrial R&D Scoreboard [2] which covers a panel of between 1200 and 1500 
global companies, depending on year, with the largest R&D spend. The data is gathered by assessing 
annual reports and other corporate information in the public domain. We have used the data to produce 
a snapshot of expenditure patterns in 2011 and have derived indicative trends for the period 2004–2012. 
Although this data is extensive, it has limitations: 
(a) While the scoreboard has been published annually since 2004, referring to data in the previous 
year, the composition of the panel has changed. The number of companies covered has risen, 
from 1000 in the 2003 survey published in 2004 to 2000 in the 2009 survey published in 2010. 
Until 2010, the scoreboard covered equal numbers of EU and non-EU companies. Since 2011, 
a single panel covering both EU and non-EU companies has been used. 
(b) It is difficult to attribute all relevant R&D activity specifically to energy. The scoreboard 
identifies separately: oil and gas producers; oil equipment, services and distribution; electricity; 
gas, water and multi-utilities; and alternative energy. However, much energy R&D takes place 
in the electronic and electrical equipment sector and in general industrials (e.g., Siemens, 
General Electric) which cover products, e.g., transport equipment, extending beyond energy. 
R&D relevant to energy demand is particularly hard to attribute since it is embedded in wider 
R&D efforts in sectors such as automobiles and construction. Toyota, for example, is the 
world’s largest investor in R&D (over $10 billion in 2011). Manufacturers of appliances and 
electronic equipment are very R&D intensive (spending over 5% of revenue) and the total 
R&D expenditure of $50 billion vastly exceeds the $3 billion spent on energy efficiency 
RD&D by the public sector in IEA countries. 
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In addition, it should be noted that public sector data focuses on budgets rather than actual spend 
and includes demonstration activities which are not covered by the R&D scoreboard. Despite these 
limitations, the data highlights striking differences between patterns of research activity in the public 
and private sectors. 
Table 4 shows that global spend on identifiable energy R&D spend in the 2000 top R&D companies 
in 2012 was $21.6 billion, $14.1 billion of which was in OECD countries. The pattern of spend across 
sectors contrasts heavily with that for the public sector. For example, $15.8 billion of private sector 
spend is associated with oil and gas activities. This represents 0.3% of sales revenue and is a factor of 
five higher than all public RD&D on fossil fuels (which largely focuses on coal and CCS). $6.4 billion 
of this spend is associated with OECD-based producers and $3.6 billion of that is from four companies 
(BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil and Shell) based in the US or the UK. The UK and the US report 
negligible public spend on non-CCS oil and gas related RD&D. This OECD spend is matched by a 
group of oil and gas companies based in non-OECD economies, notably PetroChina, Brasiliero  
and Gazprom. 
Table 4. Industry Energy R&D Spend among the 2000 Top R&D Companies 2012 ($ billion) [2]. 
Sector OECD Non-OECD Total 
Oil & gas producers 6.4 6.1 12.5 
Oil equipment, services & distribution 2.6 0.3 2.9 
Electricity 2.9 0.6 3.5 
Gas, water & multi-utilities 1.4 0.1 1.5 
Alternative energy 0.8 0.0 0.8 
The strong role of the private sector is associated with the unique role of oil within energy markets. 
During the 1970s, there was a strong drive to substitute oil with alternative fuels where this was 
technically and economically feasible. This substitution took place autonomously through higher 
prices and market pressures and through policy drivers associated with the reduction of import 
dependence. Nuclear and coal (and later natural gas) replaced oil in electricity generation while coal 
and gas substituted for oil in industry. Oil enjoys a huge advantage in transport markets as a result of 
its high energy density and ease of storage. In 2011, 45% of oil used for energy purposes in IEA 
countries went to transport compared to 77% in 1974. 
The $3.5 billion spend in the electricity sector is highly concentrated. EDF (Électricité de France) 
and Areva, both French companies, plus Korea Electric Power account for just under half the spend, 
much of it devoted to nuclear R&D. Public sector and industrial R&D spend in the nuclear arena are 
broadly equal. Electricity companies spend 0.5% of their revenue on R&D. 
“Alternative energy” R&D aligns fairly well with public RD&D on “renewable energy” and 
hydrogen and fuel cells. Private sector R&D spend on alternative energy was $0.8 billion in 2012. 
Being less mature, most forms of alternative energy cannot yet compete with traditional forms of 
energy. Alternative technologies that have already achieved widespread deployment, such as wind and 
PV, have received the greatest support from business. Support has come not from traditional energy 
companies but from specialised companies (e.g., Vestas) and diversified engineering companies. For 
alternative energy, the public sector has been the major driver. 
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Trends in private sector R&D spend are harder to infer. The EU scoreboard used equal sized EU 
and non-EU panels up to 2010 with the R&D spend being generally lower in the EU panel. The 
following paragraphs and Figures 12 and 13 are based on a slightly smaller, but consistent, panel 
derived by including only companies spending more than $76 m2012 on R&D annually in both the EU 
and non-EU panels. While this neglects the possibility that the balance of R&D effort between larger 
and smaller companies may have been shifting, it does provide a broad indicator of trends. 
On this basis, private sector energy R&D spend more than doubled from $10.1 billion in 2003 to  
$21.6 billion in 2012 (Figure 12). Private sector spend has been static in Japan, but has grown in other 
regions. The US spend grew from $2.4 billion in 2003 to $4.2 billion in 2012, a 75% increase, before 
declining by more than a quarter in 2012. Spend in the EU region grew from $4.6 billion in 2003 to 
$8.5 billion in 2012, an 84% increase. By far the greatest increase was in China, which recorded a  
527% increase from $0.6 billion in 2003 to $3.5 billion in 2012. The 2008 financial crisis arrested 
growth in 2009, but spend profiles recovered in 2010 and 2011. However, the aggregate spend 
stabilised in 2012, with growth in the EU and China compensated by falls in the US and Brazil. 
Figure 13 breaks down spend over the 2003–2012 period by sector. Spend was static in the 
electricity and other utility sectors, but there was a very large increase in oil and gas R&D spend, 
rising from $6.2 billion in 2003 to $15.8 billion in 2012, an increase of 255%. 
As discussed more fully in the following section, patterns of R&D spend strongly suggest that the 
private sector focus is on extending the resource base and reinforcing the current energy paradigm 
while the public sector focus is on technologies that will break the existing paradigm in response to 
wider policy drivers. 
Figure 12. Private sector energy R&D spend over the period 2003–2012, by region [2]. 
(Includes only companies spending more than $76 m2012 annually on R&D.) 
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Figure 13. Industry energy R&D spend over the period 2003–2012, by sector [2]. 
(Includes only companies spending more than $76 m2012 annually on R&D.) 
 
6. Discussion 
The previous sections have described the policy and scientific drivers currently spurring energy 
innovation, as well as contrasting several scenarios from the public and private sectors with divergent 
views of the global energy future. The same tension regarding energy futures can be seen in the 
comparison of public and private sector RD&D spend patterns as reflected in dramatically different 
technological priorities and resource spend. Through the lens of innovation studies, this can be 
considered as a classic scenario following the historical pattern of a technological paradigm shift. 
When a traditional technological regime is threatened by transformative innovations, actors invested in 
the original regime can respond by driving innovation efforts that improve and strengthen the existing 
paradigm [36]. For instance, sailing ship technology improved in response to the rise of steam-powered 
ships in the 19th century. The response of LCD display manufacturers to the development of organic 
light-emitting diode (OLED) displays provides a contemporary example. 
When seen through this lens, public policy concerns on energy security and climate change can be 
interpreted as driving investment into transformative low-carbon technologies, whereas private sector 
energy actors broadly conduct R&D that reinforces the existing energy paradigm by exploiting new 
and unconventional fossil fuel resources and reducing the costs of utilising existing sources. It can be 
argued that some technologies, such as carbon capture and storage (CCS), help to “bridge” this gap by 
enabling a low-carbon way to utilise existing fossil fuel resources. Developments such as the shale gas 
revolution seen in the US could also help to ease policy pressures by reducing concerns around energy 
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security and affordability, and could reduce greenhouse gas emissions in countries heavily reliant on 
coal-fired electricity generation.  
The difference between private and public sector R&D investment patterns is largely reflected in 
contrasting scenarios of the global energy future (Section 4). These show substantive differences in 
energy demand, GHG (Greenhouse Gases) emissions, and the mix of primary energy sources between 
the IEA 2DS scenario, a normative scenario which aims to meet the objective of keeping global 
temperature rises below 2 °C, and the energy company outlooks, which reflect the extrapolation of 
current social and economic trends. Although most of the low-carbon technologies deployed at scale in 
the 2DS scenario appear in the energy company outlooks, they are deployed later in time and to a 
lesser extent. This suggests that public R&D efforts will not necessarily lead to “stranded” 
technological assets in the event the global energy future is closer to private sector predictions. 
However, it does raise the question as to whether public sector funds are being spent in the most 
effective and cost-effective manner. 
There is disagreement in the academic literature as how to develop the most optimal strategy for 
innovation in the energy sector. One view is that, due to the long lead times from basic research to 
deployment, high capital costs and long payback periods for investors of many new energy technologies, 
there is a significant “valley of death” in the development of new energy technologies in which sufficient 
private finance to continue commercialisation is difficult to obtain, stifling innovation. Addressing this 
challenge would entail targeted support from the public sector to sustain the development of promising 
new technologies through this gap, allowing experience to be built up from “learning-by-doing”, and 
allowing economies of scale for new technologies to be more easily achieved [37]. The view that the 
public sector plays an essential role in providing long-term funding for new technologies, assuming 
much of the risk of developing new sectors, is gaining ground outside the energy innovation debate [38]. 
The alternative view is that the public sector should not try to “pick winners”, and should therefore put 
in place policies designed to achieve government aims and targets in a technology-neutral way. A tax 
on carbon emissions is an example of a technology-neutral policy. Under this view, governments 
should provide greater funding for general early-stage R&D, with the private sector better placed to 
identify promising technologies and develop these further [39]. 
7. Conclusions and Further Questions 
This paper has used a range of public and private sector data to test the hypothesis that the energy 
sector is currently seeing a pace of innovative activity unseen since the late 1970s. In this light, 
fundamental divergences in view over the future development of the global energy system can be seen as 
part of a dynamic reinforcing higher levels of effort. The current state of the energy sector, in a state of 
tension between two diverging viewpoints of a public policy-led transformative effort and reinforcing 
efforts led by the private sector, provides an interesting opportunity to investigate how urgent public 
policy concerns affect the development and commercialisation of new technological solutions. 
Current developments in energy innovation suggest a rich research agenda for both innovation 
scholars and those with an applied research interest in energy policy. Within an overarching narrative 
about system transformation and reinforcement of the existing paradigm, there is scope to study,  
inter alia: innovation systems for different types of technology in terms of degrees of innovation,  
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the engineering scale of technologies (from complex systems to commodity products); systemic 
technologies (e.g., smart grids); organisation and priority-setting processes for public sector innovation 
in different countries and jurisdictions; and the structure of transnational innovation systems 
characterised by the operations of global companies and the mobility of human capital. Further work to 
establish the theory of a strong technology push in this area would include the analysis of returns on 
investment in R&D in the private sector, both in a commercial sense and by utilising other metrics 
such as market penetration or energy efficiency improvements and whether these returns are increasing 
or decreasing with time. Data to answer this question would be very difficult to obtain, but if possible 
it would be a rewarding avenue of study. 
This paper has also not discussed the role of the public sectors emerging economies such as China, 
India and Brazil due to the absence of relevant data. This is however an important part of the debate, 
given the large and increasing role these countries are playing in the global energy system.  
Further work in this area to assess the extent of the role these emerging economies are playing in the 
innovation process would be of considerable interest. 
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